US Flag


1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: Today

The Golden Dragons in Combat
14th Infantry Battalion Command History Report
15 January 2009


I. The Battalion's Mission

II. Executive Summary of Battle Operations

III. Overview of Company Operations

A. Alpha "Reaper" Company in Tarmiyah, Iraq

B. Bravo "Bushmaster" Company in Rowad and Sadr City, Iraq

C. Charlie "Rock" Company in Mushadah, Iraq

D. Hqtrs & Hqtrs Company (HHC) "Hellhound" Company
     in Sheik Hamad Village, Iraq

IV.  Commander's Comments

Photos:  -  Tarmiyah-Sons-of-Iraq

I. The Battalion’s Mission

From the outset of 2008, CTF 1-14's mission was to control Qada Tarmiyah by partnering with Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) to neutralize Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI), promote responsive local governance to preserve conditions 
for effective reconciliation, and maintain a safe, stable and secure environment.  CTF 1-14 also had the mis-
sion to transition to tactical over-watch with ISF assuming the lead role in securing the Tarmiyah Qada.

II. Executive Summary of Battalion Operations

Combined Task Force 1-14 (CTF 1-14) served in combat from 15 January 2008 through 15 January 2009
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 07 - 09 vicinity Tarmiyah, Iraq while assigned to the 2d Stryker Bri-
gade, 25th ID and Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND-B).  The ist Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment 
"Golden Dragons", deploying from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, joined Soldiers from the Macedonia's
Special Operations Forces and operated in partnership with the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraqi Police (IP), 1st Infantry
Division's Military Transition Teams, and the 18th Military Police Brigade's Police Transition Teams to form
CTF 1-14 in December 2007.

Over the next 14 months, CTF 1-14 disintegrated numerous terrorist and insurgent cells, eroded AQI Northern
Belt's strategic and operational caches, and rendered the enemy incapable of stemming the rapid progress 
throughout the Qada in security, ISF capability, markets, essential services, and governance.  In the first 11
months, CTF 1-14 had executed over 30 named battalion-level missions: Operation DRAGON NA'AR, Oper-
Operation DRAGON VOTE.  Collectively, CTF 1-14 would also execute over 60 additional named company
-level operations.  These operations resulted in the capture of 52 battalion and higher High Value Individuals (HVI)
and a total of 243 targeted insurgents, 40% of the Stryker Brigade's total.  CTF 1-14 also captured and de-
stroyed over 175 caches and eroded the enemy resources so severely that for months there was a dramatic
decline in military munitions used by the enemy.  The pace and precision of these offensive operations drama-
tically increased security and set the conditions for amazing gains across all lines of effort, including the hiring
and training of local IA and IP, the complete revitalization of the local Iraqi economy, the drastic improvement
of local Iraqi infrastructure, including schools and roads, and a remarkable enhancement of local governance.
All of this was accomplished in the decisive and most contested terrain in Baghdad's northern belt, an area of
operations (AO) which early in the deployment was established as the 2d Stryker Combat Team's main effort.

By the time CTF 1-14 assumed responsibility of the Tarmiyah Qada, there were many areas and villages that
had not seen US forces in well over a year and the threat of Large Buried Improvised Explosives Devices 
(LBIED) limited routine movement to less than 35 kilometers along two major roads.  By August 2008, CTF
1-14 controlled the entire Qada, routinely patrolled its 400 (+) square kilometer area, and rendered the enemy
unable to sustain effective attacks anywhere in the CTF 1-14 battle-space.  Remarkably, the two areas pre-
viously receiving the highest frequency of Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) attacks are now a thriving
market and an IA checkpoint with almost no enemy activity.  This control and freedom of improvement was
in part attributable to a dramatically increased forward presence that is unmatched throughout MND-B.

In January 2008, less than one third of the previous unit was forward securing the population in their commun-
ities.  CTF 1-14 quadrupled the number of platoons and companies forward near the population centers securing
the Iraqi people, enabling CTF 1-14 leaders and soldiers to develop close relationships with the local Iraqi 
leaders, develop the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people, provide quick action against developing threats, 
and give responsive support to the Iraqi people and ISF.  The effect was so profound that the population believed
that CTF 1-14 was twice the size of the previous (and identical) unit.  During this time, CTF 1-14's soldiers suf-
fered from the elements, cramped conditions (living in Stryker Infantry Vehicles and dilapidated hallways), poor
sanitation, and limited communication with loved ones back home.  After several months, CTF 1-14 built
safe forward bases for it's Soldiers with reliable electricity, AC/heat, latrines, showers, sleeping areas, cable TV,
internet, and phones at al of CTF 1-14's Golden Dragon companies.  Indeed, robust retention rates and increased
morale were then and have since been pervasive throughout the battalion... as the solid and empowering feeling
of real camaraderie. 

In early 2008 there were fewer than 30 IA Soldiers assisting US forces to secure Qada Tarmiyah.  Ctf 1-14
acted deciseively to partner with the 37th IA Brigade as it went through force generation, training the 3rd Bat-
talion, 37th IA Brigade and executing developmental operations with the balance of the battalions.  This close
partnership quickly increased IA combat power operating in the Tarmiyah Qada by a factor of 20 from a single
platoon at a single checkpoint in Tarmiyah to a brigade (-) executing partnered company level operations and
living forward at the JSSs and patrol bases throughout the entire CTF 1-14 area.  IA patrols became ubiquitous
in the Qada and IA leadership was coached to develop close working relationships with tribal, government, and
police leadership.  By July 2008, the 37th IA Brigade had been relieved in place by the 36th IA Brigade, with 
whom CTF 1-14 continued to approach of close partnership and shared responsibility and risk, and quickly pro-
gressed to the point of full tactical over-watch in one third of its area and completed a decisive transfer of the 
Sons of Iraq (SOI) to the control of the 36th Brigade.  Both the 37th and 36th Brigades are now well trained and
the 36th Brigade IA is well prepared to secure this Qada with little Coalition Force assistance.  The successful
partnership with the IP was no less impressive.  Throughout 2007, Al Qaeda had forced the withdrawal of all IP
from the city, but by June 2008 CTF 1-14 had reestablished the IP district headquarters in Tarmiyah and sub-
stantially enhanced the local IP's capability to fight an urban insurgency.  The IPs are now increasingly serving
warrants, routinely enforcing the rule of law, and executing local recruiting activities. 
CTF was equally aggressive in pursuing its non-lethal objectives and achieved unprecedented success in market,
essential services, and governance development.  In January 2008 all of the markets in Tarmiyah and along the
Baghdad-Mosul Highway were brown, lifeless, and more likely to be used for an enemy ambush than a place of
business.  The Mushadah Market exemplifies the progress made in all nine of the Tarmiyah Qada's markets.  By
mid-summer 2008, these markets had only three functioning shops, but with the return of security, the applica-
tion of numerous small entrepreneurial grants to prospective business owners, and the targeted application of
essential services projects, this market (and most others) has bloomed with color, activity and a variety of new 
shops.  More specifically, this single market now has well over 250 shops and is growing rapidly; note that this
is 80 times the number of shops present in January 2008 and more than triples the number under the pre-war

When CTF 1-14 assumed responsibility for the Tarmiyah Qada, deteriorating security had resulted in every single
US dollar and Iraqi dinar having been withdrawn from all projects and there was no government budget and little
connectivity between village, township, and Qada.  The Qada government and tribes were completely disassoc-
iated from Baghdad and almost no one dared travel to the city of Tarmiyah.  As CTF 1-14 secured the Qada, it
initiated a bold plan to simultaneously invest in education, roads, markets and essential services while using the 
project management process to exercise atrophied local governance functions.  Beginning at the township/Nahia
level with school projects, CTF 1-14 continued to raise the expectation for governance participation and over-
sight, until almost all of the latent governance functions at the Nahia ande Qada level were being fully exercised
and Iraqis were selecting, prioritizing, managing and quality assuring/quality controlling (QA/QC) all of their own
projects. Encouraged by their progress and security, the Tarmiyah leaders continued to reach out to Baghdad,
holding two Joint Rural Planning Committees (JRPC) and a high visibility Expo where key governance and re-
construction issues were discussed.  These and other media events highlighted their successes, demonstrated that
Tarmiyah was again ready to receive GoI investment, and helped the Tarmiyah Qada reconnect with Baghdad.
Amazingly, CTF 1-14 and the Tarmiyah government, in a period of only nine months, had rebuilt 50 schools and 
completed or initiated an additional 85 essential services projects for over $24 million and secured projects and
budgets from the GoI for over $40 million.

Perhaps the best measure of CTF 1-14's effect is the profound increase in cooperation from the Iraqi people who,
because of the enormous multi-pronged lethal and non-lethal efforts of CTF 1-14, became committed to ridding 
their communities of insurgents.  Because the Iraqi people placed more and more trust in CTF 1-14, the local
populace began to believe they were secure from retribution, and have since experienced a profound improvement
in their own quality of life.  As evidence of this, local Iraqis have continued to share information which prevents
the insurgent from hiding among the population.  By early Fall of 2008, Al Qaeda had no safe haven in the CTF 
1-14's AO.  CTF 1-14 has eroded Al Qaeda's resources and has confiscated over 100 large weapons and explo-
sives caches from areas Al Qaeda believed beyond CF's reach.  CTF 1-14 continually disintegrated Al Qaeda's 
networks of leadership, resources, and membership, thus effectively defeating his every effort to reestablish an
effective presence.

III. Overview of Company Operations

Alpha: Reaper Company in Tarmiyah, Iraq

The collective accomplishments of CTF 1-14 are demonstrable by the best of metric proving results.  However
the accomplishments of individual companys towards the overall battalion mission also merit specific recognition.
CTF 1-14's Alpha Company, the "Reapers", executed 10 named operations:  Operation REAPER ALLIANCE,
Operation REAPER KAMEENA, Operation MUKHABA, Operation REAPER CHARGERS, Operation REAPER
QUANAS, and Operation REAPER VOLCANO I-II.  Reaper Company, the Brigade's main effort company com-
prised of a Task Force of 263 men and women, secured the battle-space in and around the pivotal, and at one time
Al Qaeda stronghold, city of Tarmiyah, Iraq.  By assuming responsibility for Joint Coordination Center (JCC)-
Tarmiyah, the Reapers added to their combat power an entire IA Battalion, an IP Station, and a 500 strong SoI
local security force.  From four fixed sites, this company was able to effectively secure the population and deny
the enemy freedom of maneuver.  In this, the Reapers made a strong impact on the city of Tarmiyah in a number
of ways.  One of these ways involved the capture of the Al Qaeda "Arms Room of Tarmiyah".  Through local in-
formants, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and standard infantry small unit tactics, Reaper Company
managed to locate and remove over 50 caches across the Battalion's area.  The scope of these caches ran the full
spectrum of capabilities from tactical to operational levels.  The significance of these caches was obvious as the
Reapers eroded literally tons of homemade explosive (HME) material and even long-range rocket systems capable
of ranging CFs on nearby combat outposts (COP), joint security stations (JSS), and forward operating bases
(FOB).  Additionally, the Reapers captured a significant stockpile of direct action cell weapons and ammunition.
These weapons included "silenced" long range sniper systems, complete IED systems, mortar firing systems com-
plete with ammunition, and surface-to-air missiles located along a key air maneuver corridor between Baghdad and
Balad.  Also, significant to the cache finds were the discovery of four underground bunker hide sites, and multiple
AQI facilities (bed-down locations for foreign fighter elements, prison cells for kidnap victims, and VBIED and
IED manufacturing centers).  During Operation REAPER TEDMEER and Operation REAPER MUKHABA,
Reaper Company first effectively eroded enemy resources and then destroyed the capacity for them to return to
their historical support zones.

The Alpha Company Reapers also established local governance and rebuilt local economy in the greater Tarmiyah
area as the local economic markets and basic social services of Tarmiyah suffered greatly under the iron-rule of Al
Qaeda.  So pervasive was the Al Qaeda influence that not one instrument of governance or commerce was immune
to its influence.  During the 14 months of their deployment, the Reapers oversaw the re-emergence of the Tarmiyah
Qada as a legitimate governing body and an infusion of capital investment that transformed once nearly empty mar-
ket streets into a vibrant and booming center of trade.  Effective security set the conditions for sustainable economic
growth, active governmental participation, and the reconnection of what was once the self-declared capital of the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) to the Baghdad government.  Because Reaper Company was also able to protect all key
infrastructures in their area of operation, it was able to revitalize Tarmiyah's moribund economy through the crea-
tion of a tailored network of security, employment projects, scores of business grants, and over 50 major essential
service and education projects for more than $10 million.  Hundreds of reconstruction projects and micro-business
grants, countless hours of coordination and planning meetings, coupled with a clear primacy of purpose and a ten-
acious work ethic, allowed the men and women of Reaper Company to guide Tarmiyah back onto the path of re-
conciliation and a return to normalcy.

Reaper Company also relentlessly disintegrated AQI and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) attack cells.  An example of this
was during Operation REAPER MO-ZAIN, when the Reapers aggressively targeted terrorists and their support net-
works.  The Soldiers of Reapers Company detained dozens of high value targets (HVT) from Division, Brigade, and
Battalion level.  Its intelligence Support Team (IST) was often the catalyst in identifying, developing, nominating,
and actioning on these targets.  Its ability to draw from all levels and disciplines of intelligence and then fuse them
into actionable targets were key to this company's success.  Captures ranged from local IED emplacers to AQI emirs
and financiers.  Through a network of information and sources, Reaper Company always targeted with precision and
restraint, ensuring that AQI found no safe haven among the population, and all the while maintaining dignity and re-
spect of the citizens of Tarmiyah for their continued support in the fight against Al Qaeda.

CTF 1-14's Reaper Company also built and enabled the most effective, though targeted, SoI partnership.  In this en-
deavor thee was an unprecedented level of cooperation and support between the men of Reaper Company and the
SoI in Tarmiyah.  this city, once known as the headquarters for AQI and a hotbed for Sunni insurgent groups, com-
pletely transformed after the establishment of the SoI program.  Despite suffering 14 deaths from terrorist attacks and
dozens of casualties to their ranks, the SoI stood firm against terrorism.  Their confidence was bolstered by the efforts
of Reaper Company supporting elements which included dozens of MEDEVAC flights to treat casualties to include
five MASCAL events.  The supporting elements also included the mortar section which alone fired over 50 mortar fire
support missions to SoI troops in contact.  The company launched well over 100 Quick Reaction Force (QRF) mis-
sions in response to IED threats, small arms contacts, and other attacks against SoI and the citizens of Tarmiyah.
Reaper Company also oversaw the manning, managing, pay distribution, and eventual transition of arguably the most
successful SoI program in the Brigade's battle-space.

 One of the most rewarding achievements of Reaper Company was that it secured the people of Tarmiyah in the areas
where they lived and slept.  Even the most determined and calculated efforts of Sunni Insurgent Groups and Al Qaeda
Iraq were defeated with superb intelligence, the precise application of combat power, and an ubiquitous security pre-
sence that included an average of nearly 24 platoon patrols each day, control over all access in and out of the city,
and over 30 Iraqi manned/Us supervised checkpoints.  From the outset, the men and women of Reaper Company de-
ployed forward into JSS - Tarmiyah and made it their home, rarely returning to the larger FOB in Taji, Iraq.  This
company continuously manned joint IA/IP/SoI and CF checkpoints which all effectively gated the city of Tarmiyah.
The end result of these efforts was a renewed sense of security in the population; this in turn enabled local security
forces to gradually assume a larger role in securing its people.  As part of Operations REAPER DAKHALIYA and
Operation REAPER SAYTARA, the company's unparalleled and aggressive patrolling kept the enemy at bay and al-
lowed the civil services to grow by leaps and bounds.  Moreover, the men and leaders of Reaper Company interacted
daily and in most cases hourly, with the citizens of Tarmiyah and became quite familiar faces in the town.  Reaper
Soldiers mastered the Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) strategy of gaining rapport with the population, demon-
strating our resolve and commitment to help, and then fostering this bond to the benefit of the Mission.

B. Bravo "Bushmaster" Company in Rowad and Sadr City, Iraq

Also of note, CTF 1-14's Bravo Company "Bushmasters" executed nine named operations:  Operation BUSH-
MASTER BRIDGEPORT, and Operation BUSHMASTER SLINKARD.  One of the more versatile companies
in the 2d Brigade Stryker Combat Team, the Bushmasters conducted a variety of fundamental operations.  One
of their well-executed reoccurring missions were the regular combat patrols in Abayachi and Rowad, Iraq ---
an area of over 150 square kilometers of terrain that previously had not seen significant US or CF activity or
support in over two years.  The Bushmasters also actively patrolled and retained a skillful combination of lethal
and non-lethal targeting.  Through relentless projection of combat power to every corner of the battle-space,
Bushmaster Company succeeded in reconciling the vast majority of the population and successfully disintegrated
several IED and small arms fire (SAF) cells operating in and around the Route Tampa corridor.  During the entire
period that the Bushmaster Company owned and operated within this battle-space, no CF or ISF Soldier was
killed, nor was there a single catastrophic IED strike on any route, including MSR Tampa, within the boundaries
of the Bushmaster AO.

In an impressive feat of training and organizations, the Bushmasters organized, stood up, and managed six separ-
ate SoI contracts, employing over 1000 personnel manning over 45 security checkpoints.  this action directly re-
sulted in the development of an environment inhospitable to AQI and other special groups attempting to conduct
enemy operations within the Bushmaster AO.  It also produced the most stable and secure environment the area
had experienced since the initial US military's invasion in 2003.  Furthermore, the Bushmasters successfully
partnered with two different IA infantry battalions, integrating them into areas and population centers that had
zero previous exposure to ISF units.  Through dedication to joint training and combat operations, the Bushmasters
accelerated the transition to tactical over-watch and helped to cement local confidence in the competence and
capabilities of the ISF.  Key accomplishments included the establishment of the first permanent IA patrol base in
Abayachi and the successful transition of all SoI contracts to 100% ISF management and GoI control.

Another task at hand was the literal creation from scratch of a JSS in the Brigade Operational Environment (OE)
near the village of Rowad.  With the determination to fight for scant resources, the Bushmasters planned, con-
structed, and secured what would become the largest JSS in the Brigade OE.  This JSS occupied key terrain border-
ing directly on MSR Tampa and centrally located between three of the four principal municipalities in the Bush-
master AO.  As the most forward staging area for joint operations, JSS -- Rowad was integral to the Battalion's tre-
mendous success in degrading IED cells operating along the Route Tampa Corridor.  JSS -- Rowad was a tremen-
dous example of the extensions and grip of combat power at the company level.

Perhaps the most impressive of its feats during its OIF rotation, was its conducting a no-notice intra-theater deploy-
ment to defeat a Jaysh Al Mahdi (JAM) uprising in Sadr City, Iraq.  The Bushmasters were chosen for this high-
profile mission as one of only three companies in the entire Brigade to deploy to Sadr City in order to defeat the
violent rebellion.  For nearly two straight months, the Bushmasters conducted high-intensity, kinetic combat opera-
tion.  In spite of being engaged daily with IED, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and SAF attacks from every
direction, the Bushmasters succeeded in completely dominating its area of responsibility, routinely receiving the high-
est accolades from all general officers in Multi-National Division, Baghdad.  Within only one week, the Bushmasters
had denied the enemy use of every historic point of origin in Thawral, effectively preventing all rocket attacks di-
rected at Camp Taji and the International Green Zone.  Within a mere month, they had defeated all JAM and special
groups operating North of Route Plutos and South of Phase--Line Gold.  While there, the Bushmasters engaged in
over 40 days of continuous fighting in difficult urban terrain.

Upon their return to the Abayachi and Rowad AOs, the Bushmasters remained in the lethal fight.  Through effective
targeting and skilled analysis of key intelligence, they captured over 16 brigade and battalion HVI and also captured
over 25 weapons and munitions caches.  The cumulative effect of these successes, along with millions of dollars
spent on reconstruction efforts, severely degraded the capabilities of AQI operating in the area, completely eroded
any support these insurgent organizations may have still had with the local populace, and completely disintegrated
the North Tampa AQI cell that was previously untouched...

Charlie: "Rock" Company in Mushadah, Iraq

Also greatly contributing to the many successes of the Golden Dragon Battalion was CTF 1-14's Charlie "Rock"
Company which executed 27 named operations:  Operation HARD ROCK, Operation ROCK CHAOS I-VI,
Operation ROCK DENIAL I-V, Operation ROCK OVERWATCH I-II, Operation ROCK RECON I-II, Opera-
tion ROCK RED HONU, Operation ROCK SCORPION I-III, Operation WHITE EAGLE, Operation ROCK
and Operation ROCK DISRUPTION.  Rock Company, which owned key battle-space in the greater Mushadah
area, is one of the more accomplished and aggressive units in the entire Brigade, capturing twice as many de-
tainees as the average maneuver company in the Brigade with a significantly higher rate going forward to FOB
Cropper for future imprisonment due to thorough, standard-setting sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and intelli-
gence development.  As a result of this hard intelligence work, Rock Company captured 35 caches, causing a
major shift from military grade munitions to homemade explosives (HME) in their AO.  Moreover, Rock Com-
pany significantly contributed to the complete disintegration of the Jamal Ali Salih North Tampa IED Cell and
completely disintegrated the Nadeem/Nassir 57mm rocket cell.  By establishing control over the perilous Route
Coyotes, Rock Company was able to precipitously reduce IEDs on this road within 90 days of the Transfer of
Authority (TOA), changing the most dangerous 'Black' route in the Brigade into a route that has become a
major business artery traveled many times daily by Deliberate Combat Logistics Patrols (DCLP), ISF, and CFs.
As a unit, Rock Company exhibited endless energy, the average Rock platoon averaged over 100 combat patrols
each month since the TOA.  This omnipresent approach helped extend Rock's reach from the Route Tampa
corridor to every road and village in the AO from western Nubai and the quarries to the palm groves along the

Rock Company also partnered with an IA BTR battalion, bringing it from force generation through independent
and IA led platoon level patrols in only 90 days.  Rock Company then developed the Mushadah IPs from a sta-
tion bound force to the point of routinely serving warrants and executing missions to enforce the rule of law.  
This was all accomplished in an area with a dramatically increased risk to the CFs due to their pushing out to the
local communities and extending their reach and contact with the population.  This meant living forward at the
JSS, which in turn meant sleeping in Strykers, on the roofs of buildings, and sleeping in shifts and hot-bunking
for a period of over six months.  Rock Company, true to its namesake, negotiated these challenges as it did all
others --- determined to "get tough or die".

Hqtrs & Hqtrs Company (HHC) "Hellhound" Company in Sheik Hamad Village, Iraq

CTF 1-14's Headquarters Company (HHC), the "Hell Hounds", executed 12 named operations:  Operation DRAGON
Operation HOUND OVERWATCH, Operation HHC FAFNIR I-II, and Operation MIKE SAYTARA I-II.  Hell Hound
Company, though initially a traditional HHC, in a remarkable display of innovation, creatively developed into a maneuver
unit unto itself.  CTF 1-14's Hell Hound Company was the only HHC throughout the entire Brigade, and for a time the
only HHC in the theater, to not only own battle-space but also execute missions and conduct full spectrum operations
as a maneuver unit.

Upon the arrival of the Hell Hounds to the Sheik Hamad Village/A1Hesayway area, the local Iraqis had little or no cap-
ability for self-governance.  The Hell Hounds established a local Town Council in the Sheik Hamad Village/A1Hesay-
way area which was then able to manage and begin to meet the needs of the populace.  Built from the ground up, the
local counsel mirrored the official Nahia councils of the GoI.  This council was able to help facilitate projects and jobs
throughout the area Sheik Hamad/A1Hesayway areas.  The Hell Hounds, as CTF 1-14's Time Sensitive Target (TST)
mission company, were responsible for the capture of multiple brigade and battalion HVIs and accomplished this through
demanding and short-notice TST missions, executing both ground assault and air assault operations.  An example of the
no-nonsense approach which pervaded the Hell Hound Company is found in their first month in country.  Within their
first 30 days, the Hell Hounds were responsible for the capture and detainment of Hardan Muhammad Hardan Al-
Mashadani and Muhammad Jasim Hardan Al-Mashadani, two of the Brigade's High Value Targets (HVT).  The Hell
Hounds also conducted several other TST missions throughout the deployment resulting in the capture of Jamal Thabit,
Adnon Muhammad Jusayn Al-Jumayli and numerous other HVTs.

CTF 1-14's Hell Hounds were later assigned the responsibility of training an entire IA infantry battalion, which was so
well coached and mentored that it was able to assume battle-space after only a few months of intensive yet professional
training.  Impressively, each Hell Hound platoon took on the responsibility of training an infantry company, while simul-
taneously maintaining their grueling patrol schedules and pursuing major Public Works Projects and lethal targeting in
the Hell Hound AO.  Still, the end result of the US/IA partnership training program was arguably one of the best trained
battalions in the 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team's battle-space, and an IA battalion able to flexibly partner successfully
with both the Bushmaster and Rock companies -- which the IA Battalion did effectively on multiple occasions.

While assuming Bushmaster Company's battle-space during their operations in Sadr City, the Hell Hounds were directly
responsible for degrading and the SAF cell operation along Route Tampa, north of Mushadah.  This was accomplished
through the capture and detainment of the infamous financier "Mohammed Fadil Hardan" and his active elements of the
SAF cell Mahmud Mohammed Mahmud, Awos Adnon Jasim, and Mushtak Talib Shanath Thamir.  In short, when this
lethal SAF cell was effectively put out of action, CF's lives were saved.  The Hell Hounds were also responsible for the
decapitation of key Jaish Al Rashadien (JAR) operation in their support zone of Uzri village during Operation DRAGON
NA'AR.  Before, during and after this operation, the Hell Hounds systematically targeted and captured multiple leaders
of this JAR cell, to include Mahmud Fadil Ismail, Sa'ad Sabir Naji (another infamous financier and spiritual leader for
JAR), and multiple cell members.  Indeed, the Hell Hounds demonstrated their unique blend of flexibility, mentorship,
and lethality in any mission assigned to them at any time and at any location on the battlefield.

IV.  Commander's Comments
Over the course of 14 months, CTF 1-14 executed with excellence nearly 100 named operations across 6400
kilometers of battle-space with a network of 10,000 miles of roads.  This brave battalion of dedicated Golden
Dragon Soldiers would endure the heartbreak on one KIA, one DOW, and 15 WIA brothers-in-arms.  Deter-
mined to make a difference in Iraq's future, the Golden Dragons overcame the tremendous loss of their com-
rades, rebounding to re-organize the moribund Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) into a well-organized, purpose-
ful 4000 man militia.  This organization, which became the history making group known as the "Sons of Iraq",
is an organization now known around the world.  CTF 1-14 would make it's grit known amongst all other units
by earning over 300 awards for combat service and valor, finding and clearing over 175 caches, capturing 52
HVIs, and detaining 243 individuals who posed a direct threat to American and CFs.  In these and any other
quantifiable metric of success with which an Infantry battalion might be honored, CTF 1-14 succeeded well
beyond all expectations.  The Golden Dragons offered the greatest of sacrifices, accomplished it's missions with
the utmost precision and determination, all the while exhibiting an unending sense of duty and compassion
which profoundly touched the lives of the Iraqi people and decidedly changed their futures forever.